N A TIO N S
iMm), Security Council
24 December 1997
LETTER DATED 1 NOVEMBER 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour to refer to my letter of 27 September 1996 (S/1996/816)
regarding the activities undertaken by the International Commission of Inguiry
(Rwanda), in pursuance of resolution 1053 (1996) of 23 April. In that letter I
stated, inter alia , that, with the concurrence of the Security Council, it was
my intention to reguest the Commission to submit its report by 31 October 1996.
That report is attached herewith.
I should like to draw the attention of the Security Council to sections
VIII and IX of the report, which contain the Commission's conclusions and
recommendations. I wish to refer, in particular, to paragraph 119 in which the
Commission indicated that, pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 1053 (1996) and
subject to the concurrence of the Security Council, it intended to continue its
work with a view to following up its investigations, pursuing any further
allegations of violations and making periodic reports on the evolution of the
situation with regard to compliance with the relevant Council resolutions. In
the same paragraph, the Commission expressed the view, however, that its mandate
would need to be reviewed in the light of any decision that the Council may
take, pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1053 (1996) concerning the
deployment of United Nations observers or in the light of any other decisions
that the Council may adopt to address the deteriorating situation in the Great
In my letter of 13 March 1996 addressed to the President of the Council
( S/l 996/1 95 ) , I emphasized that, in the absence of voluntary contributions to
the budget of the Commission, as called for in paragraph 8 of resolution
1013 (1995), the Commission would continue to be financed as an expense of the
Organization. I wish to reiterate in this connection that, in order to enable
the Commission to pursue its work, the necessary additional appropriations would
have to be made in the context of the regular budget of the Organization.
In this connection, however, I should like to observe that the situation
within the region has changed dramatically over the period since the Commission
was appointed, and indeed, since the submission of its report. Furthermore, as
I have informed the Council in my letter of 29 October 1996 ( S/l 996/ 88 8 ) , I have
appointed Mr. Raymond Chretien of Canada as my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes
region. He will report to me at the conclusion of his mission; I will keep the
Council informed accordingly.
' Signed ) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI
/. . .
Third report of the International Commission
of Inguiry (Rwanda )
1. By paragraph 1 of its resolution 1053 (1996) of 23 April 1996, the Security
Council reaffirmed the importance it attached to the work of the Commission of
Inguiry, to the investigations it had conducted to date and to continued
effective implementation of the relevant Council resolutions.
2. By paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Council reguested the Secretary-
General to maintain the Commission of Inguiry on the basis set out in
paragraph 91 (c) of the report of the Commission of Inguiry (S/1996/195, annex)
to follow up its earlier investigations and to stand ready to pursue any further
allegations of violations, especially of current and expected arms shipments.
3. In its report to the Security Council dated 14 March 1996 (S/1996/195,
annex), the Commission described its investigations into the sale or supply of
arms and materiel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region
in violation of the arms embargo imposed by the Council in resolution 918 (1994)
of 17 May 1994. The Commission, acting pursuant to its mandate as set forth in
resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995, also reported on its activities in
the Great Lakes region and elsewhere and on the contacts it had made with
Governments of the region and others pursuant to its inguiries.
4. In particular, the Commission reported the difficulties it had encountered
in obtaining information and cooperation from some of its interlocutors,
particularly the Government of Zaire. While the Commission met with senior
Zairian cabinet ministers in Kinshasa, its investigations in Goma were hampered
by the uncooperative attitude of the Zairian officials assigned to assist it in
its work. The Commission was unable to visit the United Republic of Tanzania or
Uganda during the period from November 1995 to February 1996 and wanted to
ensure that it would be able to do so when it returned to the region pursuant to
resolution 1053 (1996) .
5. Accordingly, in preparation for the Commission's return to the Great Lakes
region, the Secretary-General wrote on 14 May 1996 to the Governments of Zaire,
the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda to inform them of Security Council
resolution 1053 (1996) and to reguest their cooperation in meeting with and
assisting the Commission.
6. The Commission reconvened in New York on 8 July 1996 and, after proceeding
to the field on 12 July, returned on 21 October. In accordance with resolution
1053 (1996), its size was reduced from six members to four, as follows:
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt), Chairman
Brigadier Mujahid Alam (Pakistan)
/. . .
Mr. Gilbert Barthe (Switzerland)
Mr. Mel Holt (United States of America).
7. The Commission had a small support staff.
8. Since much of the information obtained by the Commission during the
investigations it has conducted since July 1996 corroborates, amplifies or
otherwise refers to the findings it presented to the Security Council in January
and March 1996 in documents S/1996/67 and S/1996/195, it might be helpful to
read the present report in conjunction with the Commission's first two reports.
II. ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY SINCE 12 JULY 1996
A . Activities in Kenya
9. On 12 July 1996, following a briefing for new members at United Nations
Headguarters, the Commission arrived at Nairobi, where offices were provided for
it by the United Nations Office at Nairobi. The Commission then renewed
contacts it had made in Kenya during its earlier tour of duty from November 1995
to February 1996.
B . Activities in Rwanda
10. The Commission visited Rwanda from 24 to 29 July and met there with the
Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Ma jor-General Paul Kagame, and other
senior officials to renew contacts made earlier. In addition, one Commissioner
visited Rwanda a number of times in August and September to maintain official
and unofficial contacts, inspect captured weapons and interview prisoners
captured in cross-border incursions from Zaire.
11. The Commission was informed that the number and duration of such incursions
were increasing and they were penetrating deeper into Rwanda. Some originated
in Bukavu and Uvira and came up through Burundi into the south of Rwanda.
12. The information acquired by the Commission concerning fund-raising by and
arms sales and deliveries to the former Rwandan government forces and military
training to destabilize Rwanda is dealt with in detail below.
C . Activities in the United Republic of Tanzania
13. The Commission visited Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, United Republic of
Tanzania, from 11 to 17 August 1996. During its visit, the Commission met with
the Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Frederick Sumaye,
Mr. Ali Amieri Mohamed, Minister of Home Affairs, the Director General of
Intelligence and Security, and other senior government officials in a position
to assist the Commission's investigations. The Prime Minister and Minister of
Home Affairs informed the Commission that it was their Government's policy not
to allow the United Republic of Tanzania to be used as a base for military
training or for political activities by the refugees, nor were refugees
permitted to have arms. At subsequent working-level meetings, the Commission
was informed that the camps, which were located close to the Rwandan border,
were very large and that there was a great deal of intermingling between the
refugees and the local population. The Commission requested and received
authorization to visit the Rwandan refugee camps on Tanzanian soil in Ngara
district. The visit took place from 28 to 30 August.
14. The two Commission members who conducted the visit were accompanied by the
Tanzanian Civil Defence Officer and Protocol Officer; a protocol officer of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ; the Head of
the Refugee Section of the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs; and the Security
Officer of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. The Commission
members visited Benaco, Musuhura, Keza, Mulonzi and Kitale Camps, the Rusomo
post on the border with Rwanda and the Kabanga post on the border with Burundi.
The Commissioners also spoke with refugees, local officials, UNHCR officials and
non-governmental organization representatives.
15. A number of themes were clearly apparent from the information supplied to
the Commission by all these various sources, and from its own observations.
There was no evidence that arms and materiel were being sold or supplied to the
remnants of the Rwandan government forces and militia now resident in the United
Republic of Tanzania, no arms caches had been discovered, and arms were
apparently not borne or openly displayed within the camps. Nevertheless, small
arms were said to be available in the camps. On 22 August 1996, the Tanzanian
police had arrested seven Rwandans on charges of conducting unspecified
military-type activities, and were seeking a further two individuals on the same
16. A senior Tanzanian official very familiar with the refugee situation and
security-related matters categorically informed the Commission that military
training was being conducted among the exiled Rwandans, who were in the process
of "organiz ( ing) themselves to do a mass assault" against Rwanda. The
Commission was also shown arms that were said to have been obtained from the
Rwandan refugees in the region and was provided with an official list of weapons
and ammunition that had been obtained from the Rwandan refugees.
17. The Commission was informed that military training was being conducted day
and night around the camps and in the surrounding hills and forest in both Ngara
and Karegwe districts. This involved small-unit tactics as well as more serious
training. The refugees had considerable freedom of movement, including the
ability to cross into Rwanda and Burundi, but it was not thought that armed
incursions were being conducted from the United Republic of Tanzania into
Rwanda. However, there was evidence that some Rwandans in the United Republic
of Tanzania were collaborating closely with Burundian groups working to
destabilize and overthrow the Government of Burundi. There was also evidence of
considerable contact between the Tanzanian camps and the Rwandan refugee camps
in Zaire, via both Rwanda and Burundi.
18. Evidence that organized fund-raising, known as a "war tax", was being
conducted among the Rwandans in the United Republic of Tanzania was also
/. . .
presented to the Commission. The "war tax" was being levied from the economic
activities in which the Rwandans were engaged, including their work as employees
of non-governmental organizations. Some portion of the proceeds of crimes such
as the hijacking of vehicles and extortion carried out by Rwandans were also
said to fund the military effort. Religious and church-related activities,
which were said to have greatly increased in the past year, were also suspected
to serve as a cover for military-related fund-raising and exchanges of
19. Refugee leaders interviewed by the Commissioners were unanimous in
rejecting charges of genocide in 1994 and categorically said that there had been
no genocide, but fighting between former Rwandan government forces and the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in which many people had been killed on both sides.
They argued that the side which had been defeated was now being blamed for
genocide. The refugee leaders refused to accept that the genocide of Tutsi and
moderate Hutu was an established and well-documented fact, and maintained that
many killings had taken place before 1994, and that many Hutu had been killed by
RPA forces and by Tutsis. They argued that when one Tutsi was killed the
international community took it seriously, but the deaths of hundreds of Hutu
attracted no attention. It was not clear to the Commission whether this
attitude was the spontaneous expression of genuine feelings or whether it
represented the result of prolonged indoctrination.
20. Sources also informed the Commission that there was open talk among some of
the refugees of an "insecticide" operation, by which was meant the annihilation
of the Tutsis. The name refers to a common Hutu epithet for Tutsi RPF fighters,
" inyenzi " , or cockroaches.
21. However, during its talks with senior officials of the Tanzanian
Government, the Commission was informed that the refugee population was very
divided. Though refugees themselves told the Commission they wanted to return
home in peace, there are known to be well-organized " intimidators" who exercise
considerable control over the camp populations.
D . Activities in Uganda
22. On 12 September 1996, the Commission was invited to meet with senior
Government officials, including security officials, in Kampala during the week
of 16 September. In the event, the Commission met with the First Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eriya Kategaye; the Third Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Mr. Paul Orono Etiang;
the Director-General of the External Security Organization; and other senior
government officials, as well as with the Resident Representative of the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and others.
23. The information obtained by the Commission in Uganda was corroborated by
high-level official sources and documents. According to these, the recruitment
and extensive training of Rwandans were taking place at several locations in
eastern Zaire, and non-Rwandan instructors might be involved. Recruitment was
said to be taking place in Gahindo (Kahindo) , Gatare (Katale) and Mugunga.
Burundian rebels were training at Uvira. Zaire was identified as a conduit for
/. . .
the supply of arms both to the former Rwandan government forces and the
Interahamwe and the Burundian Front pour la defense de la democratie (FDD) . In
a particular instance in April 1996, Zairian military authorities were said to
have been directly involved in training the former Rwandan government forces in
the use of anti-aircraft and heavy guns at Rumangabo barracks under the command
of an air force officer named Captain Bila. The Forces Armees Zairoises (FAZ)
had also transported heavy arms (alleged to have been previously confiscated
from the former Rwandan government forces) from their camp at Katindo to the
former Rwandan government forces camp at Mugunga, where weapons parts were
reportedly seen being reassembled and fitted. Other locations where training
was said to be carried out included Nyamirima, Buramba, Kiryandonyi and Ihimbi
Forest in Rutshuru, near the border with Uganda.
E . Activities in South Africa
24. In its report to the Security Council in March 1996 (S/1996/195, especially
paras. 21-39 and 41-45), the Commission described the involvement in a highly
probable violation of the Security Council arms embargo of a South African
national, Mr. Willem Ehlers, identified as the director of a company called
Delta Aero. Subsequent investigations conducted by the Commission indicated the
need to explore further the apparent involvement of individuals of South African
nationality in the sale or supply of arms to and the conduct of training by the
former Rwandan government forces.
25. Accordingly, three members of the Commission visited South Africa from 1 to
7 September 1996 and met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alfred Nzo;
the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Professor Kader Asmal, who is also
the Chairman of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) ; the
Deputy Director General, Department of Foreign Affairs, Multilateral Branch; and
police and other government officials. Commission members, who visited
Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban, also met with members of the
Cameron Commission, which had been established by the Government of South Africa
to investigate possible South African involvement in illegal arms transactions;
officials at the Institute for Defence Policy and its Regional Project on the
Proliferation of Arms Trafficking; officials of Executive Outcomes, a private
military consultancy company based in Pretoria; and Mr. Willem Ehlers, Director
of the Delta Aero Company.
26. The Commission received firm assurances of full support and cooperation
from the Government of South Africa and from the Cameron Commission, and has
made arrangements to maintain close contacts with both concerning allegations of
the involvement of South African nationals or companies in matters under
investigation by the Commission.
27. The Commission was informed by its various interlocutors that the South
African arms industry, which had until 1994 operated covertly, was being brought
under increasing government control. However, individuals who had been involved
in the arms trade or the armed forces during the apartheid era were still active
in an individual capacity or in private industry. The Government was taking
active steps to restrain their activities, which included dealing in arms and
providing mercenary services .
/. . .
28. When interviewed by the Commission at the UNDP office in Pretoria,
Mr. Ehlers offered a detailed account of the arms deal referred to in
paragraph 24 above, which essentially corroborated the account contained in the
Commission's report to the Council. Mr. Ehlers also expressed appreciation to
the Commission for offering him the chance to put his point of view, and spoke
of his distress over accounts of his activities in the media. He had been
assured that the arms were destined for Zaire and had been "shocked" to read
subseguently that the recipients were in fact the former Rwandan government
29. Mr. Ehlers told the Commission that the "main spokesman and authority" that
he had dealt with was a Zairian official known to him as "Hunde". It was
"Hunde" and another Zairian, "Jean", who had approached him in May 1994 in
Pretoria to say that Zaire wished to buy a guantity of rifles and ammunition for
the Zairian military. On the basis of information it has independently
received, the Commission believes these men to be Mr. Hunda Nzambo and
Mr. Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza. The two told Mr. Ehlers that they would like to go
to Seychelles with him and with their "technical expert" to inspect the weapons
and ammunition offered for sale. The "technical expert" was
Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, a leading figure in the former Rwandan government
forces now in detention in Cameroon in connection with the genocide of
30. The transaction then unfolded much as described in paragraphs 29 to 36 of
the Commission's previous report (S/1996/195) . However, while the price paid
for the arms according to banking documents made available to the Commission was
$330,000, Mr. Ehlers stated that the parties arrived at an agreed price of
$300,000. The Commission is unable to explain the apparent discrepancy of
$30,000, or 10 per cent of the price Mr. Ehlers cites.
31. Another small discrepancy relates to the nationality of Mr. Ruhorahoza, who
arrived on 16 June 1994 aboard the Air Zaire DC-8 aircraft used to transport the
arms to Goma. Mr. Ruhorahoza entered Seychelles on 16 and 18 June 1994,
accompanying the aircraft back to Goma on 17 and 19 June. According to the
information provided by Seychelles, Mr. Ruhorahoza used two different passports.
On 16 June he is listed as a Rwandan, holding a passport No. 002978 issued at
Kigali on 20 May 1994. On 18 June, he is described as Zairian, with a passport
issued in Zaire on the same date and bearing the same number. In both cases,
his occupation is given as "Fonct ionnaire de l'etat" or " f onctionnaire" . Upon
further inguiry to Seychelles, the Commission has received copies of the
immigration forms filled in by Messrs Ehlers, Nzambo and Ruhorahoza for the
dates in guestion, but can provide no explanation for this discrepancy.
32. In his discussion with the Commission, Mr. Lafras Luitingh, Director of
Executive Outcomes, said that he would very much like to help the United
Nations, but that he did not have hard evidence to support the allegations being
investigated by the Commission. However, Mr. Luitingh indicated that his
organization might be in a position to discover such evidence and that, if it
succeeded, it would be willing to offer its cooperation on a commercial basis in
return for suitable payment. The Commission was not in a position to discuss
this offer further, but agreed to maintain contact with Executive Outcomes.
/. . .
F . Activities in Belgium
33. A member of the Commission visited Brussels and Oostende from 3 to
7 September. The aim of the visit was to investigate allegations that numerous
suspicious cargo deliveries to Central Africa had passed through Oostende
airport. The Commissioner received the full support and assistance of the
Belgian customs authorities, studied the airport records from 17 May 1994 to the
present, was given access to all the documentation he reguested, observed the
physical checking of goods and had contacts with commercial sources, as well as
airline and cargo company executives. No indication was found of any
involvement in possible violations of the embargo.
34. In Brussels, the Commissioner had extensive contacts with a number of
officials from the Sanctions Assistance Missions Coordination Centre in the
European Commission offices, including British, Italian and Russian
representatives. In addition, the Commissioner met with some individuals.
G . Activities in the United Kingdom
35. From 3 to 8 August, a member of the Commission visited London to meet with
Amnesty International officials and representatives of other sources of
information about events in the Great Lakes region, including a pilot with
information about private cargo airlines flying in the region.
36. The information acguired strengthened the Commission's belief that arms
were reaching the former Rwandan government forces from a variety of sources via
Eastern Europe, including the former Yugoslavia, and Zaire. According to the
sources contacted, the arms are transported for the final leg of the trip by
light aircraft capable of landing on small airstrips, including the one at Bunia
near Lake Albert. The Commission also received the names and contact numbers of
several individuals and companies operating in Europe and in Zaire who were said
to be familiar with arms flows in the Great Lakes region.
III. APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTS
37. The Commission has approached several Governments it believes might have
information that would assist it in its investigations, but is still awaiting
many replies. In particular, the Commission has contacted the Governments of
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Italy,
Kenya, Malta, Portugal, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zaire and Zambia to reguest
information in connection with specific allegations relating to the
transportation of arms destined for the former Rwandan government forces. The
Commission has also approached the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 918 (1994), the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch. It is following up leads regarding
fund-raising allegedly being conducted by Rwandan refugees for the purpose of
buying arms in violation of the embargo.
/. . .
A . Belgium
38. On 7 October 1996, the Commission requested information from the
Administration des Douanes et Assises of Belgium regarding a report concerning
arms of Eastern European origin that the Commission believed might have been
delivered to the former Rwandan government forces with apparent indirect
assistance from a Western European country. The Administration replied on
8 October that no inquiry had been conducted into the matter, and invited the
Commission to take the matter up with the Belgian Foreign Ministry. The
Commission wrote to the Foreign Ministry on 14 October inquiring whether any
investigation had been conducted by the Belgian authorities into allegations of
the falsification of origin of weapons; if so, whether any documents seized in
the course of that investigation indicated the final destination of the weapons;
and whether or not the end users were the former Rwandan government forces. No
reply had been received by the time of the submission of the present report.
B . Bulgaria
39. Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Commission's report of 14 March describe the
request it made of the Government of Bulgaria for information following the
broadcast of a British television programme called "Merchants of Death". The
programme featured a Bulgarian company whose executives were portrayed as being
prepared to deliver arms to Rwanda in violation of the United Nations embargo.
On 14 February 1996, the Government of Bulgaria informed the Commission that a
thorough investigation had "proved that the aforementioned allegations are
40. In a note verbale dated 1 March 1996, which did not reach the Commission
until after the submission of its previous report to the Security Council, the
Government of Bulgaria stated the following:
"In May 1995 a British firm named 'Ordkit Supplies' approached the
Bulgarian KoKINTEX Share Holding Company. The Commercial Director of the
British firm, a Mr. Paul Calverly, claimed to be representing the interests
of several Central African States, and particularly of Rwanda.
"This preliminary contact did not result in any further action.
"The Bulgarian national licensing authority for the arms trade is the
Interdepartmental Council on the Military Industrial Complex and
Mobilization Readiness. This body has not issued an export licence for a
transaction concerning Rwanda and no such transaction was found to have
"Bulgaria would thus like once again to reiterate its principled
policy of strict abidance by all sanctions imposed by the Security Council,
as well as its readiness for dialogue and cooperation in the name of peace
and security, with the competent authorities of the United Nations and in
particular with the International Commission of Inquiry."
41. In its meetings with various information sources in London in January 1996
the Commission encountered Mr. Paul Calverly, a journalist. The Commission
understands that "Ordkit Supplies" is a name invented for the purposes of an
"undercover" television programme.
42. On 6 August, the Chairman wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Bulgaria asking him to make available to the Commission any information which
might have come to light pursuant to the investigation referred to in the
Bulgarian note of 1 March, and requested the Government's assistance in the
event that the Commission decided to interview executives of the KoKINTEX
company. No reply has been received.
C . Cameroon
43. In its 14 March report, the Commission established that a central role had
been played in the Seychelles arms transaction of mid-June 1994 by Colonel
Theoneste Bagosora, a high-ranking officer in the former Rwandan government
forces. On learning in December 1995 that Colonel Bagosora was then resident in
Goma, the Commission made provisional arrangements to interview him on its
arrival there in January 1996. However, as described in its interim report
(S/1996/67, paras. 34-38) the Commission was not able to pursue its inquiries in
Goma as intended. The Commission subsequently learned that Colonel Bagosora had
fled to Cameroon, where he was arrested in March 1996 by the authorities in
connection with his alleged role in the events of April 1994 in Rwanda.
44. On 7 August 1996, the Chairman of the Commission wrote to the Government of
Cameroon asking for authorization to interview Colonel Bagosora. A reminder was
sent on 11 September, but no reply has yet been received.
D . Cyprus
45. On 24 September 1996, the Commission approached the Department of Customs
and Excise of Cyprus in connection with the identity of the recipient of a
number of telephone calls from Hutu extremists, apparently concerning an arms
deal. The information was provided on 25 September and has assisted the
Commission in its continuing investigations.
E . Czech Republic
46. On 10 September 1996, the Commission wrote to the Finance Ministry of the
Czech Republic to inquire about possible approaches to that country's arms
industry that might have originated from the former Rwandan government forces.
No reply has been received.
47. On 31 August 1996, the Chairman of the International Commission wrote to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt in connection with a report that two
/. . .
aircraft registered in Ukraine, each said to be carrying 30 tons of arms, had
landed in Egypt in June 1996 en route from Bulgaria to Kinshasa, and that the
arms could have been destined for the former Rwandan government forces in
violation of the United Nations arms embargo. One of the aircraft, registration
No. UR76539, crashed at Kinshasa airport on the night of 5-6 June 1996 after
unloading the arms. The Chairman requested the cooperation and assistance of
the Government of Egypt in its inquiry into the matter. No reply has yet been
G . France
48. On 9 October 1996, the Chairman of the Commission brought to the attention
of the Government of France allegations that had been made to the Commission by
a high-level source in one of the Governments of the Great Lakes region. The
allegations concerned a meeting said to have taken place recently between an
individual said to be of French nationality and General Augustin Bizimungu,
chief of staff of the former Rwandan government forces, at Mugunga . In a note
dated 21 October 1996, the Government of France categorically denied the
allegations and added that no person accredited by the Government of France had
met under any circumstances with the former Rwandan government forces.
49. On 1 August 1996 the Chairman of the Commission met with the Italian
Ambassador to Kenya and asked him, inter alia , about information received by the
Commission to the effect that a former foreign minister of an Eastern European
country now resident in Italy had publicly admitted signing authorizations for
the transit of arms destined for the former Rwandan government forces through
his country in violation of Security Council resolutions. The Commission
subsequently wrote to the Italian authorities on 5 August 1996 and to the
Commissione Centrale per il Riconoscimento dello Status di Rifugiato on
20 August requesting further information about the alleged incident with a view
to locating and interviewing the former minister. No reply has been received to
50. On 17 September 1996, a member of the Commission visited Kibuye on the
Rwandan side of Lake Kivu, where he inspected weapons seized from insurgents who
had infiltrated into Rwanda. The weapons included TS-50 anti-personnel
landmines which, the Commissioner was informed, were manufactured in southern
Italy and which had not been available to the former Rwandan government forces
before the imposition of the embargo.
51. Accordingly, the Commission wrote to the Government of Italy on
26 September to request information regarding the factory where the mines were
said to have been manufactured, the countries to which they were delivered,
delivery dates, the parties involved in the transactions and details of the
end-user certificates and payment details. No reply has yet been received.
/. . .
I . Kenya
52. On 16 July 1996 and again on 19 August 1996, the Chairman of the Commission
wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya recalling that the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, by its note dated 29 February 1996 addressed to the
Chairman, had proposed that meetings be arranged between the Commission and the
Government of Kenya as soon as the Commission returned to Kenya from New York.
The Chairman also brought to the attention of the Minister the fact that serious
allegations had been made and continued to be made concerning fund-raising
activities being conducted among Rwandan circles in Kenya which were said to be
connected with the sale and supply of arms to the former Rwandan government
forces in violation of the Security Council arms embargo. The Chairman also
renewed his reguest to be placed in touch with senior Kenyan military, police
and customs officials who might be in a position to assist the Commission in its
investigations into these allegations.
53. On 30 August 1996, the Foreign Minister of Kenya replied to the Chairman
expressing his Government's readiness to cooperate with the Commission and
informing him that the Ministry was in the process of coordinating the
Commission's request to meet relevant senior Kenyan government officials. The
Minister also requested the Commission to provide him with particulars of the
fund-raising activities reportedly being conducted by Rwandan expatriates in
Kenya and elsewhere. Despite subsequent additional approaches by the
Commission, no meeting took place. The Chairman wrote again to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on 8 October recalling the Commission's repeated efforts to
arrange a meeting, and stating that the Commission's inability to meet with
senior Kenyan military, police, customs and intelligence officials had hindered
54. On 23 August 1996, two members of the Commission met with the General
Manager of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Nairobi. The Commission asked a
number of questions relating to cargo and charter flights bound for Goma and
those originating from Eastern Europe, to which the General Manager promised to
provide information within one week. The Commission was also informed that the
amount of illegal weapons transiting through Kenyatta Airport was negligible
because of the strict checks and controls employed. However, there was a
possibility that Wilson airport or any of the smaller airports might be used for
such activity. The Commission has not yet received the additional information
promised by the General Manager.
55. Various sources in Kenya gave the Commission information concerning
fund-raising being conducted in Kenya among the Rwandan expatriate community and
military training being received by the former Rwandan government forces in
Zaire and the flow of arms to them. The information from these sources and
others is discussed in greater detail below.
56. On 22 August 1996, the Chairman of the Commission wrote to the Government
of Portugal to request its cooperation and assistance in identifying weapons on
the basis of serial numbers provided by the Commission. The weapons had been
/. . .
found on Iwawa Island, Rwanda, following a battle with insurgents in
November 1995 and appeared to be of Portuguese origin. The Chairman asked if
the Government could notify the Commission of the origin and export details of
the weapons. No reply has yet been received.
K . Spain and Malta
57. On 22 August 1996, the Chairman of the Commission wrote to the Governments
of Spain and Malta to reguest information about the flight of a Nigerian-
registered B-707 aircraft, registration No. 5N-0CL, which, according to
information received by the Commission, left Madrid for Malta on 24 May 1994 and
proceeded to Goma, Zaire, from Malta on 25 May. The Commission had reason to
believe that the aircraft was carrying 39 tons of arms and ammunition, which may
have been destined for the former Rwandan government forces. In addition to its
cargo, the aircraft was said to have carried a single passenger, listed as
"Bagosera, T.", who is believed to have boarded the aircraft in Malta. No reply
has yet been received from the Government of Spain.
58. In a letter dated 18 September 1996, the Maltese Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs responded that an investigation carried out by the
Maltese authorities had disclosed that the Nigerian aircraft had arrived in
Malta from Madrid at 0135 hours on 25 May 1994; that it had left on 26 May at
0925 hours bound not for Goma, Zaire, but for Lagos, Nigeria; and that no
passenger by the name "Bagosera, T." could be traced from the immigration
59. On 4 October 1996, the Chairman of the Commission wrote again to the
Government of Malta making reference to the General Declaration submitted by the
crew of the aircraft in guestion, which named "Bagosera T." as the passenger,
and reguesting the Government for further documentary evidence in respect of
aircraft 5N-OCL. No reply has yet been received.
L . Seychelles
60. On 21 August 1996, the Commission wrote to the Government of Seychelles
reguesting further information concerning the financial details of the arms
transaction involving Seychelles which was described in the Commission's
14 March report. The next day, the Government of Seychelles replied that it had
provided the Commission with all the information at its disposal in connection
with the financial details of the transaction and all other aspects of the
enguiry, and concluding that the Government had nothing further to add or to
convey on the matter.
61. On 11 September 1996, the Commission wrote again to the Government of
Seychelles reguesting clarification and documentation concerning the movements
of Mr. Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza in and out of Seychelles during June 1994. The
Government provided the Commission with copies of the immigration records of
Mr. Ehlers, Mr. Nzambo, Colonel Bagosora and Mr. Ruhorahoza for that month.
/. . .
62. On 17 July 1996, the Commission wrote to the Federal Office for Foreign
Economic Affairs in Bern, Switzerland, asking for information regarding the
payments relating to weapons deliveries from Seychelles to Zaire on 17 and
19 June 1994 and described in the Commission's 14 March report. The payments
were made by two transfers of sums of money to Seychelles in its account in the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The origin of the first payment was the Union
Bancaire Privee in Geneva, and the second was listed as "one of our clients" and
appeared to have originated from the same Union Bancaire Privee.
63. On 15 October, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government
of Switzerland wrote to the Commission, saying in part:
"... investigations in Switzerland are encountering numerous problems of a
legal and practical nature, hence a more detailed analysis of the situation
will be needed. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the
possibilities of assistance, if any, and the procedures to be followed.
Under the circumstances, regrettably, no immediate reply can be expected.
"We are following this matter closely with the Government Procurator's
Office and will certainly keep you informed of any developments."
N . United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
64. On 26 August 1996, the Chairman of the Commission wrote to the
International Liaison Section of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise, United
Kingdom, recalling two earlier letters he had sent on 30 November and
18 December 1995 and reguesting information concerning a British-based company
said to have been involved in transporting arms to Goma. No reply has been
65. On 7 October 1996, the Chairman wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence
reguesting technical assistance in identifying a number of weapons on the basis
of their serial numbers. On 11 October, the Commission received a reply to the
effect that the serial numbers provided only a tentative guide as to the origin
of the weapons, and direct inspection would be more conclusive. However, owing
to time constraints, the Commission has not yet been able to arrange such an
66. The most pointed and detailed guestions before the Commission concern
Zaire. Allegations of the illegal delivery of arms to the former Rwandan
government forces indicate overwhelmingly that the supply flights were destined
for eastern Zaire, initially to Goma and Bukavu airports in Kivu Province, but
more recently to smaller airstrips. The Commission has also received
allegations that Ndolo airport at Kinshasa serves as a kind of hub for weapons
shipments, some of which are reloaded onto light aircraft and redirected to
67. In view of the continuing allegations of Zairean involvement in the illegal
supply of arms to the former Rwandan government forces, the Commission has
repeatedly tried to obtain from the Government of Zaire information about these
allegations and permission to resume its investigations in and around Goma. Its
efforts have been fruitless.
68. On 14 May 1996, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1053 (1996), the
Secretary-General wrote to the Prime Minister of Zaire, Mr. Kengo wa Dondo,
drawing to his attention the provisions of the resolution and reguesting his
Government to authorize the Commission to return to Goma to resume its
investigations. There has been no reply.
69. On 7 August 1996, the Chairman of the Commission wrote to the Permanent
Mission of Zaire to the United Nations recalling the Secretary-General's letter
and noting that no reply had been received. The Chairman once more reguested
authorization for the Commission to resume its activities in Goma.
70. On the same day, the Chairman also wrote to the Zairian Minister for
Foreign Affairs referring to the letter written by the Charge d'affaires of
Zaire to the President of the Security Council on 3 April 1996 (S/1996/241)
concerning the 14 March 1996 report of the Commission. In that letter, the
Charge had criticized the Commission and sought to refute some of its findings.
The letter had also referred to an inguiry into the matter that was being
conducted by the Government of Zaire. The Chairman asked the Minister to
communicate the results of that inguiry to the Commission. No response has been
received to any of these demarches.
P . Zambia
71. On 16 October 1996, the Commission wrote to the Government of Zambia
drawing to its attention allegations that several deliveries of arms and
materiel had been made from the port of Mpulungu on Lake Tanganyika in February,
March and May 1996 with the participation of six men, including at least two
Rwandans and two Zambians, to Goma and Bukavu in Zaire. The Commission has
reason to believe that these arms were destined for the former Rwandan
government forces. The Commission asked the Government of Zambia if it was
aware of these allegations and if it had undertaken any investigation into them.
At this point, no reply has been received.
Q . International Civil Aviation Organization
72. On 22 August 1996, the Chairman wrote to the Secretary-General of ICAO
reguesting details of flight 5N OCL from Madrid and Malta on 24 and 25 May 1994.
No reply has yet been received.
73. The Commission wrote again to ICAO on 29 August concerning another flight
it believed might have been transporting arms to the former Rwandan government
forces. No reply has yet been received.
/. . .
R . Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 918 (1994) concerning Rwanda
74. On 2 August 1996, the Chairman of the Commission wrote to the Chairman of
the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994)
concerning Rwanda to ask if the Committee had received any information since the
submission of the Commission's report on 14 March 1996 that might be of
assistance to the Commission.
75. In his reply, the Chairman of the Committee informed the Chairman that
since his last communication dated 8 February 1996, which was reflected in the
Commission's report to the Security Council (S/1996/195, annex, para. 57), the
Committee had not received any information relating to the sale or supply of
arms and related materiel to the former Rwandan government forces in violation
of resolution 918 (1994) .
IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
76. By its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995, the Security Council
reguested the Secretary-General to investigate reports of military training by
and arms transfers to former Rwandan government forces in violation of its
resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995). As noted in the
Commission's report to the Security Council dated 14 March 1996 (S/1996/195,
annex, paras. 52-60), during the period from October 1995 to March 1996 the
reports and allegations concerning these matters emanated at that time primarily
from the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch, which in May 1995
issued a report entitled "Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the
Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide". In addition, reports were published by
Amnesty International and various European media.
77. During its second tour of duty in the field, from July to mid-October 1996,
the Commission received information from a much wider variety of sources,
including Governments. Much of the information acguired in individual
interviews was confidential or inconclusive, or both. Very often the Commission
thought it advisable to obtain corroborating evidence from other sources,
including other Governments. In many cases, as described above, the Commission
is still awaiting a reply from many of the Governments it has contacted for
assistance in following up these allegations.
78. The wide variety and great differences in background, standing and apparent
motivation of the individuals and groups providing it with information on
alleged violations of the embargo of all kinds prompted the Commission to grade
its sources as "highly reliable", "reliable" and "fairly reliable". While the
Commission gave most credence to "highly reliable" sources, it was also prepared
to act on data from "reliable" and "fairly reliable" informants if they were
independently corroborated. In classifying its sources thus, the Commission
also took into account such considerations as the extent to which the sources
themselves might have been implicated in activities in violation of Security
Council resolutions, and weighed their first-hand knowledge of such operations
against their desire to avoid self-incrimination.
/. . .
79. Notwithstanding the reservations noted above, the sheer volume and
consistency of the information gathered in several different countries from
several independent sources, when reviewed all together and compared against the
background of the Commission's own experience during the period November 1995 to
March 1996, proved highly convincing. Though some sources for security reasons
cannot be named, the Commission is confident that the observations and
conclusions it has arrived at are soundly based on accurate information.
V. FUND RAISING
80. Shortly before submitting its 14 March report to the Security Council, the
Commission received strong indications from Rwandan sources that funds were
being raised among Hutu communities worldwide for the purpose of financing the
insurgency against Rwanda. Since the alleged purpose of the fund-raising was
explicitly said to be to purchase arms in violation of the embargo, the
Commission considered it within its mandate to investigate these allegations, as
far as it could.
81. In addition to the information received in the United Republic of Tanzania
(see paras. 13-21 above), the Commission has received indications from various
sources that a complex, organized multinational fund-raising and taxing system
exists and appears to be controlled by prominent members of the Hutu community.
82. Notwithstanding reports about indirect contributions from countries said to
be involved in facilitating arms transactions, fund-raising is said to be
carried out in three ways: in the refugee camps; among Hutu communities
worldwide, organized from Nairobi; and in Rwanda itself.
83. In the camps in Zaire, the United Republic of Tanzania and, until recently,
Burundi, one of the major sources of the "war tax" is reportedly the sale of
relief goods donated by international humanitarian organizations. Each family
is supposed to contribute $10 per month. Contributions are also levied from the
Hutu local employees of such organizations. For example, the Commission was
informed that in the United Republic of Tanzania, some 10,000 to 12,000 refugees
are employed by non-governmental organizations in various capacities at salaries
ranging from 9,000 to 22,000 Tanzanian shillings per month. Out of this, each
"taxpayer" is supposed to contribute 15 per cent, which would yield in the
region of $500,000 annually. This income is said to be supplemented by a tax on
commercial activities such as the operation of minibus and truck transportation
services, as well as the proceeds of crime, including hijacking and extortion.
84. Wealthy Hutus in Kenya and Zaire are also said to have contributed to
fund-raising efforts, which have yielded up to $2 million. Hutus living in
Rwanda contribute according to their individual wealth, and the money raised is
said to be used to purchase arms. Highly reliable sources indicate that the
leaders of the former Rwandan government forces and Interahamwe hold regular
meetings in Nairobi, their organizational and financial headguarters , to discuss
fund-raising and general strategy. All the funds raised are said to be
concentrated in one individual bank account. The Commission has gathered a
great deal of information about the financial activities of the former Rwandan
/. . .
government forces, but has not had sufficient time to follow up all the leads it
has been given.
85. Nairobi is also the location of some religious organizations, which were
named to the Commission, and which are said to be providing an undetermined
amount of money to the Rwandan political and military elite every month. The
ostensible purpose of the money is to meet the day-to-day needs of the Rwandan
community, but it is in fact reportedly used to buy arms.
86. Sources the Commission has classified as "reliable" indicate that regular
fund-raising meetings of high-level former Rwandan government military and
civilian officials are held at Nairobi hotels located in Hurlingham, Kasarani,
Adams and Upper Hill, as well as places on the outskirts of Nairobi such as
Kayole and Komarock. Participants sometimes include almost all the Rwandan
refugee population in Nairobi, including the former Rwandan government forces
chief of staff General Augustin Bizimungu, Brigadier-General Gratien Kabiligi,
former Foreign Minister Dr. Casimir Bizimungu and the businessman
Felicien Kabuga, who was said to have financed Radio Television Libre des Mille
Collines and the Interahamwe. It is known to the Commission that all these
individuals have been issued with Zairian passports with which they can travel
freely. All were leading figures in Rwanda at the time of the genocide of 1994.
87. Each of these fund-raising meetings is said to have raised, on average,
$100,000; at one meeting in March 1996 $400,000 was said to have been collected.
Money is also collected at wedding parties.
88. Some Nairobi-based crime is also said, by highly reliable sources available
to the Commission, to be a major source of funding for the former Rwandan
government forces and the Interahamwe. In particular, a printing site for the
manufacture of counterfeit United States dollars is said to be located in one of
the industrial areas of Nairobi that has been identified to the Commission. The
counterfeit currency is allegedly taken out of Kenya and exchanged abroad to buy
89. As noted in paragraph 53 above, the Commission's efforts to meet with
Kenyan government officials to bring these matters to their attention have been
VI. SALE AND SUPPLY OF ARMS
90. Reliable and highly reliable sources in Belgium, Kenya, Rwanda, South
Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United Kingdom painted a
coherent picture of huge, loose, overlapping webs of more or less illicit arms
deals, arms flights and arms deliveries spanning the continent from South Africa
as far as Europe, particularly Eastern Europe. Often the participants are
businessmen, sometimes with a military or security background, who may or may
not also be engaged in entirely legitimate operations having no connection with
the arms trade. Many are motivated more by profit than by political or
strategic considerations. The aircraft used range from large cargo carriers to
small private planes capable of landing on bush airstrips. Those engaged in
such activities make free use of fake end-user certificates, exploit loopholes
/. . .
in the law, evade customs and other airport controls by making clandestine night
take-offs and landings, file false flight plans and conceal their movements by
using fabricated zone permits, evading radar tracking and observing radio
silence in flight.
91. Amid this extensive traffic, which also deals in contraband drugs,
firearms, diamonds and gold, the sale and supply of arms and materiel to the
former Rwandan government forces is but one small piece of the mosaic. It is
clear, too, that some of the arms consignments bound for eastern Zaire are
intended for the Burundian insurgents, who are not under embargo and, for that
matter, for Zairian troops. Nonetheless, a clear pattern has emerged from the
various accounts provided to the Commissioners. According to the Commission's
informants, arms have continued to flow to the former Rwandan government forces,
often from or through South Africa, Angola, Eastern Europe and the former
Yugoslavia, and Kinshasa. Rather than landing at the relatively large airports
of Goma and Bukavu, as was reported during the 1994-1995 period, these arms are
now flown into small airstrips, possibly including Bunia near Lake Albert, some
300 kilometres north of Goma. Other airstrips in the area where arms may also
have been landed include Kahunde and Katale.
92. It has been stated as a fact to the Commission that the former Rwandan
government forces now have brand-new weapons, including Kalashnikovs and
anti-personnel mines that were not available to them before the embargo was
imposed. Many of the arms deals aimed at supplying both the Rwandian and
Burundian insurgents are allegedly conducted in Bukavu by a local business
93. According to a reliable source, in February, March and May 1996 more than
150 tons of weapons and communications eguipment were shipped from Mpulungu,
Zambia, a port on Lake Tanganyika, to Bukavu and Goma and thence apparently to
Rwandan recipients in Zaire. The first shipment allegedly took place on
23 February, when six men - two Rwandans, two Zambians, a Zairian and one other,
unknown - hired three boats, which they loaded about 30 minutes from Mpulungu
port from two four-wheel-drive pick-up trucks. The Commission was given the
names of the men, the name and occupation of the person who allegedly gave them
their orders, and the licence numbers of their vehicles. The Commission's
approach to the Government of Zambia concerning these allegations has not yet
elicited a response.
VII. MILITARY TRAINING
94. According to reliable sources available to the Commission, the exiled
Rwandan political and military elite located in Nairobi have formed an "invasion
group" to plan for the invasion of Rwanda in pincer-movement attacks from the
east and the west - the camps in Zaire and United Republic of Tanzania - which
would "meet in Kigali" to conguer the country and restore Hutu rule. The
current size of the former Rwandan government forces and militia has been
estimated at 50,000 trained soldiers.
95. In addition to the information received in the United Republic of Tanzania
and Uganda (see paras. 13-23 above), interviews conducted by a Commissioner with
/. . .
captured insurgents in Rwanda in August and September 1996 appear to confirm
that extensive recruitment and military training of refugees was and still is
being conducted, with the participation of the former Rwandan government forces
and sometimes Zairian instructors.
96. Those who have participated in the training have informed the Commission
that it takes place outside Kibumba, Kashelo, Lac Vert and Mugunga camps in
Zaire, during the day and the night, as well as in Kigombe, Rwanda, with arms
but no ammunition. They said their instructors were former Rwandan government
forces officers named as Lieutenants Semehalu and Senzira, a soldier called
Rkiabukamba, Lt.-Col. Renzaho Tharcisse, former Prefect of Kigali,
Major Ntinina, and Captains Shumbusho and Munianeza.
97. Highly reliable eyewitnesses described training of insurgents being carried
out at Zairian military camp, 20 kilometres north of Bukavu and at Bunia near
Lake Albert. Other locations where training was said to be taking place include
the Virunga Forest north of Goma, Idjwi Island in Lake Kivu, Bafwasende in the
Kisangani area and Moba on Lake Tanganyika. According to another highly placed
source in the Government of one of the Great Lakes countries, training was being
carried out in Masisi, Kalonge, Muhanga, Kibanzo, Panzi, Kamanyola and Idjwi
98. The training has apparently permitted increased insurgent activity in the
form of incursions, a major objective of which is to identify and eliminate
potential witnesses of the genocide. The Commission was given a detailed
description of the ways in which genocide survivors or those who might give
evidence to the Government of Rwanda or the International Tribunal are
identified, tracked and killed even if they are in the custody of the Rwandan
Government. Some potential witnesses have reportedly been poisoned. According
to highly reliable sources, foreign nationals and interests in Rwanda might also
be at risk and would be deliberately targeted and killed in the event of an
VIII. MATTERS PENDING
99. In the short time available to it (July to October), even with the
extension until 31 October 1996 granted by the Security Council, the Commission
was unable to follow up on all the leads opened up during the course of its
investigations. There are a number of pending guestions, some of which might be
answered in the course of time as Governments respond to the inguiries described
in various sections above. The Commission appreciates that many of the
Governments concerned have not had sufficient time to answer, in view of the
specific and detailed nature of the guestions. At the same time, the Commission
feels that some Governments could have been more helpful in responding to the
100. The main pending guestions concern allegations or incidents involving the
transportation of arms which the Commission has reason to believe might have
been destined for the former Rwandan government forces, and the origin of arms
captured from insurgents within Rwanda of a type not available to the Rwandan
government forces before the imposition of the embargo. Given enough time, the
/. . .
Commission believes the various Governments in receipt of its inguiries on these
matters might be able to shed some light on them.
101. The Commission also expresses regret once more at not having received from
the Government of Zaire a response to its reguests to resume its investigations
in and around Goma and at not receiving the results of the investigation the
Government said it was conducting.
102. Since its inception, the Commission has made repeated efforts to locate
Mr. Jean-Claude Urbano, the former honorary Vice-Consul of France at Goma in
mid-1994, who was cited as a source for the statements in the Human Rights Watch
report concerning alleged French involvement in the delivery of arms to the
former Rwandan government forces. In 1995, as reported by the Commission
(S/1996/195, annex, para. 15), Mr. Urbano brought an action for slander against
Human Rights Watch, which the latter intended to defend. However, when the case
opened in France in September 1996, Mr. Urbano withdrew his suit. The
Commission has not yet been able to locate him.
103. Other pending issues include the apparent delivery in June 1996 of 60 tons
of arms to Zaire by two Ukrainian-registered aircraft, one of which crashed at
Kinshasa; the apparent presence, according to a cargo document filed at the
time, of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora aboard a Nigerian-registered B-707 aircraft,
registration number 5N OCL, which apparently flew from Malta to Goma on
25 May 1994; the origin of weapons recently seized from Hutu insurgents in
Gitarama and Kibuye, Rwanda, which were inspected by the Commission on
17 September 1996; and the replies the Commission is still awaiting to its
approaches to Governments reguesting information concerning various aspects of
the Commission's inguiries.
IX. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
104. Despite the many differences between Rwanda and Burundi, the problems faced
by the two countries are inextricably linked because of the similarity of their
populations' ethnic composition and the presence in the United Republic of
Tanzania and Zaire of hundreds of thousands of refugees from both countries.
Thus, the conflict involving each country simultaneously affects and is affected
by developments in neighbouring countries. From the various discussions the
Commission has had with numerous government officials, non-governmental
organizations, United Nations agencies and private individuals, the Commission
is convinced that the problems of the Great Lakes region must be approached from
a regional perspective, and that the problems of one country cannot be dealt
with in isolation while disregarding the problems of the others. Any attempt to
achieve a separate solution in one country is likely to be undermined by the
volatile situation in another, thereby precluding the achievement of long-term
105. The Commission believes that many of the difficulties it has faced in its
efforts to gather information from Governments and others stemmed, inter alia ,
from the short time allowed for its investigations. Insofar as many of the
guestions posed by the Commission still remain pending, the present report must
be considered incomplete. As has been pointed out previously, the Commission
/. . .
has neither the legal powers nor the material and human resources of a police
force and must rely on the assistance and cooperation that its interlocutors
choose to provide.
106. Between mid-1994, when the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on
Rwanda, and early 1995, a spate of reports appeared in the media and in the
publications of reputable non-governmental organizations concerning the rearming
and training of the former Rwandan government forces, primarily in Zaire.
Subseguent investigation by the Commission left little doubt that arms
deliveries and training had taken place. In its first report to the Council in
January 1996 (S/1996/67), the International Commission stated its belief that
Rwandan men were receiving military training to conduct destabilizing raids into
Rwanda, but was not at that stage in a position to confirm allegations that
arms, ammunition and related materiel had been sold or supplied to the former
Rwandan government forces in violation of the relevant Security Council
resolutions. The Commission did note that rumours of embargo violations seemed
to have greatly diminished following the publication of the Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International reports during 1995 and the accompanying media
107. In its second report, in March 1996, the Commission reported in some detail
on what it considered to be a highly probable violation of the embargo involving
an arms deal in Seychelles in June 1994, and stated its belief that the
Government of Zaire, or elements within it, had aided and abetted that
violation. The Commission also drew attention to strong indications that senior
figures among the former Rwandan government forces were still actively raising
money from sympathizers abroad, apparently for the purpose of funding an
108. The Commission's resumption of its activities in the Great Lakes region
since July 1996 has produced ample and convincing evidence to support the
(a) The former Rwandan government forces, including the Interahamwe
militia, are continuing to receive arms from a variety of sources in violation
of the Security Council embargo;
(b) Former Rwandan government f orces/Interahamwe and newly recruited
fighters in Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania are intensively training
with the apparent aim of invading Rwanda from the east and the west in
accordance with plans drawn up by a central "invasion committee" based in
(c) In order to finance the above activities, Hutu communities worldwide,
supported by some host countries, are conducting a highly organized fund-raising
effort. As part of this effort, a "war tax" is being levied in the refugee
(d) There is a close link between the Rwandan and Burundian insurgent
forces, including increasing coordination, cooperation and joint planning
between the former Rwandan government f orces/Interahamwe and the Burundian
Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie and its military wing the
/. . .
Front pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD/FDD) for armed action against both
Rwanda and Burundi;
(e) Zaire, or elements within Zaire, appear to continue to play a central
role as a conduit for arms supplies to and military training of Rwandan and
Burundian insurgents on its soil, as evidenced by the growing strength of the
former Rwandan government f orces/Interahamwe and CNDD/FDD in military operations
aimed at destabilizing Rwanda and Burundi;
(f) Further efforts by the international community to gather information
on, let alone to address, these developments will reguire the establishment of a
mechanism capable of operating over the longer term.
109. The Commission made a number of recommendations in paragraphs 77 to 91 of
its 14 March report. These concerned mechanisms to monitor and implement
Security Council resolutions, to gather information and preserve evidence;
measures designed to foster stability in the Great Lakes subregion; confidence-
building measures designed to reduce the flow of arms in the subregion;
recommendations for the further investigation of violations which had or might
have taken place; and measures to deter further violations of the embargo.
Those recommendations were intended as the optimum practical steps that could be
taken at modest cost to the United Nations and Member States in order to
implement the Security Council's resolutions. Where those recommendations have
not been implemented, the Commission would propose that further thought be given
to adopting them.
110. One of those recommendations (para. 77) concerned the incorporation of
United Nations sanctions regimes in the national law of States neighbouring the
country upon which the sanctions were imposed. The Commission recommends that
consideration be given to requesting the States producing arms and materiel to
take any measure necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions
of resolutions 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995 and
1011 (1995) of 16 August 1995 and, in particular, to prosecute their nationals
for violations of the arms embargo imposed by the said resolutions. Some of the
countries visited by the Commission expressed their inability to prosecute their
nationals accused of involvement in crimes and sanctions violations while
operating from a third country. It is therefore recommended that Member States
be invited to introduce in their domestic legislation provision to prosecute
such individuals. Such a measure would tend to reduce the impunity which some
individuals and companies appear to enjoy while operating in third countries.
111. The Commission finds it very disturbing that organized fund-raising is
going on in refugee camps and elsewhere to finance the armed struggle. While
only a long-term political settlement between the parties can result in the
repatriation of the refugees in safety and dignity and the eventual resolution
of the conflict, the Commission believes that short-term measures must be taken
to help reduce the danger of large-scale fighting on Rwanda's borders. The
recent and current situations in north and south Kivu involving the Masisi area
and the Banyamulenge are linked to the presence and aggressive activities of the
/. . .
former Rwandan government forces and the Interahamwe in eastern Zaire. This
potentially explosive situation urgently needs to be addressed by the
112. In view of the fact that infiltration from Zaire into Rwanda and Burundi
has greatly increased in the past few months, the Commission recommends that the
Security Council urgently call upon the Government of Zaire not to allow foreign
armed groups to operate from its soil and to identify steps it can take to
improve the situation. These should include putting an end to the sale or
supply of arms, materiel and logistical assistance to these groups and to any
military training being carried out by them on Zairian soil. The Government of
Zaire should be called upon to live up to the responsibilities it assumed by
virtue of the Cairo Declaration of November 1995, when Zaire undertook to
prevent armed groups operating from its territory and to remove " intimidators "
from the refugee camps.
113. The Commission is aware that, pursuant to resolution 1053 (1996),
discussions have been taking place with the Government of Zaire concerning the
deployment of United Nations military observers in the airfields and at border
crossing points for the purpose of better implementation of the arms embargo and
deterrence of the shipment of arms to former Rwandan government forces in
violation of Council resolutions, but that no decision has yet been taken on
such a deployment. While the Commission is fully conscious of the precarious
security situation in Kivu Province, it continues to believe that, under the
right circumstances, the deployment of United Nations observers could have the
effect of deterring or reducing the potential for arms shipments. The
Commission therefore recommends that the Security Council keep this matter under
114. The Commission further recommends that the Security Council consider
expanding the embargo imposed on the former Rwandan government forces in its
resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995) to include a freeze on
assets, including bank accounts, of individuals and organizations involved in
raising funds to finance the insurgency. The Commission recognizes the legal
and practical difficulties of taking such a step, but believes that measures of
this kind should be considered to address this very serious threat to the peace
and stability of the Great Lakes region.
115. The Commission was given to understand by the authorities of the United
Republic of Tanzania that they know the identity of the "intimidators" in the
refugee camps in that country, but lack sufficient resources to apprehend them
and the legal authority to detain them for long periods. UNHCR has also
informed the Commission that it has provided resources to the Government of the
United Republic of Tanzania for this purpose and intends to augment this
assistance as necessary. The Security Council may therefore wish to encourage
the Tanzanian authorities to continue to liaise with UNHCR and to consult the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to see if legal grounds exist to
detain known intimidators. The Council may also wish to consider encouraging
the international community to provide both Tanzanian and Zairian authorities
with the additional technical means reguired to apprehend the intimidators, as
well as to urge both countries to exercise much greater control over their
movements and activities.
/. . .
116. The Commission's investigations since November 1995 lead it to believe that
the attention of the international community should continue to be directed at
the problem of maintaining the arms embargo against the former Rwandan
government forces. Sustained, longer-term involvement can produce worthwhile
results. Left to itself, the situation around Rwanda is likely to worsen, and
the human and financial costs of addressing it now are certain to be lower than
the cost of trying to contain a major outbreak, or of dealing with its effects
after it has occurred.
117. Although the situation in Burundi does not fall within the Commission's
mandate, the Commission cannot ignore the fact that its mandate is directly
affected by this situation. In particular, the Commission believes that the
Rwandan and Burundian insurgents in the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire
are coordinating their arms procurement, training and military operations. It
is against this background that the Commission is making the following
recommendation: should the Council decide to impose an arms embargo on the
present regime of Burundi, it should also be extended to include the CNDD/FDD.
This step should be taken not only in the interests of impartiality, but also
because the Commission believes that if any arms embargo imposed on Burundi is
not extended to Burundese insurgents outside the country, the former Rwandan
government forces will almost certainly continue to receive arms from them in
violation of Council resolutions because of the special relationship that has
developed between the two groups.
118. One of the major reasons for the unstable situation in the region is the
refusal of the majority of Rwandan refugees to return home because of their
perception that they would face persecution and reprisals in Rwanda, a
perception that appears to be justified to some extent by recent reporting by
Amnesty International and others. It is therefore recommended that the Security
Council urge Rwanda to take all possible measures to create a climate conducive
to the harmonious reintegration of the refugees in order to encourage their
return in safety and dignity as soon as practicably possible.
119. Subject to the concurrence of the Security Council, the Commission now
intends to continue, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1053 (1996),
to maintain contacts with Governments and others in the Great Lakes region, to
follow up the investigations described in the present report, to respond to any
further allegations of violations and to make periodic reports to the Security
Council on the evolution of the situation with regard to compliance with the
Council's resolutions. The Commission would recommend, however, that its
mandate be reviewed in the light of any decision that may be taken by the
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 7 of that resolution concerning the
deployment of United Nations observers. It believes that its mandate should
also be reviewed in the light of any other decisions that the Council may adopt
to address the deteriorating situation in the Great Lakes region.
( Signed ) Mahmoud KASSEM (Egypt) , Chairman
( Signed ) Mujahid ALAM (Pakistan)
( Signed ) Gilbert BARTHE (Switzerland)
( Signed ) Mel HOLT (United States of America)
/. . .
1. The International Commission of Inquiry would like to express its gratitude
to the staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and the United Nations Development Programme in Rwanda, the United Republic of
Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa for their invaluable assistance in helping the
Commission meet its logistical, transportation and communications requirements.
2. The Commission wishes to express its deep appreciation to the government
officials, United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, individual
relief workers, journalists and others who have assisted it in its activities
since the submission of its 14 March 1996 report. These include:
A . In Kenya
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya
Deputy High Commissioner of South Africa
General Manager of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Nairobi
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Italy
Ambassador of Switzerland
Ambassador of Zaire
B . In Rwanda
The Vice President and Minister of Defence
Senior military, police and security officials
Ambassador of Belgium
C. In South Africa
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Affica
The Minister for Water Resources and Forestry, and Chairman, National
Conventional Arms Control Committee
Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution and Member, Cameron
Officials of Executive Outcomes
Mr. Willem Ehlers
D . In Belgium
Director, Investigation Branch, Belgian Customs
Officials of the Sanctions Assistance Missions Coordination Centre
Ostende Airport authorities
E . In The United Republic of Tanzania
Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania
Minister of Home Affairs
Director General of Intelligence and Security
Head of Refugee Section, Ministry of Home Affairs
Special Adviser to the Prime Minister
Government Security Officer
Regional and local police officials
F . In Uganda
Deputy Prime Minister of Uganda
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uganda
Senior intelligence officials
Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme
G . In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador Shaharyar Khan